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RACE, CULTURE, AND SKILL: INTERRACIAL WAGE 
DIFFERENCES AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS, 
LATINOS, AND WHITES 
Patrick L. Mason 
This article examines the interrelationships among race, culture, skill, 
and the distribution of wages. I utilize a three-equation system to 
explore this process: skill is a multidimensional productive attribute 
measured by years of education and work effort; educational attain- 
ment is a function of class background and individual effort; and 
individual wage rates are a function of skill and class background. By 
further assuming that effort is differentially distributed across indi- 
viduals and social groups, I am able to estimate reduced form equa- 
tions for educational and earnings attainment, where both equations 
are functions of the class backgrounds and race of individuals. 
The collective results of this article challenge the conventional wis- 
dom among economists hat African American and Latino job skills 
are of a lower quality than white job skills. To the extent hat effort is 
an important element of worker skill, our results suggest hat neither 
African American nor Latino labor is of lower quality than white 
labor. The results regarding differences between African Americans 
and whites in educational ttainment, i.e., African Americans are able 
to translate agiven level of resources into higher levels of educational 
attainment, reaffirm previous findings in the literature. The results on 
Latino versus white educational attainment are novel. Additionally, 
unlike previous research, this article connects racial differences in the 
skill acquisition process to the economics of discrimination. 
INTRODUCTION 
The causes of persistent interracial earnings differentials continue to 
inspire debate among economists. More precisely, there is debate over 
the nature of the interracial wage differential which remains after ana- 
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lysts have accounted for differences in observed productive attributes. 
The magnitude of the unexplained or residual African American-white 
earnings differential (d) has stagnated or increased from the mid-1970s to 
the present, after continually decreasing during 1965-1975 (Mason, 1995a; 
Donohue and Heckman, 1992). Interracial differences in the rate of re- 
turn to observed attributes represent an "unexplained" wage differential 
(d) since identical services hould receive an identical rate of return in 
competitive markets. 1 If there are no unobserved differences in produc- 
tive attributes ("skill") among workers, then d measures the extent of 
discrimination. However, d > 0 need not imply discrimination against 
African Americans or Latinos. 2Rather, d > 0 may occur if: 1) there are 
unobserved skill differences between whites and Latinos or African Ameri- 
cans, and if 2) the mean level of these unobserved productive attributes i
higher among whites than African Americans or Latinos. 
The conventional wisdom among economists (Welch, 1973; Hirsch 
and Schumacher, 1992; Hirsch and Macpherson, 1994; Juhn, Murphy, 
and Pierce, 1991) is that given quantities of African American observed 
attributes represent less skill than similar quantities of white observed 
attributes. Therefore, intertemporal changes in d may reflect he impor- 
tance of changes in the price or relative quantities of skill rather than 
changes in the extent of discrimination. For example, Fergnson (1995), 
Maxwell (1995), Neal and Johnson (1996), and O'Neill (1990) all claim 
to demonstrate that after adjusting for differences inunobserved attributes 
via differences in Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, inter- 
racial differences in wage rates become inconsequential. These standard- 
ized test scores, which presumably capture individual-specific differences 
in productive ability, can be modeled as a function of personal attributes, 
family and community background, and optimal responses to public policy 
(Hill and O'Neill 1994). For these authors, pre-labor market discrimina- 
tion may lower test scores, since skill accumulation does not occur en- 
tirely within competitive markets, but for given skill (labor quality) lev- 
els labor market discrimination is a minor and declining issue. (See Darity 
and Mason, 1998, for a critical evaluation of this line of research.) 
It is futile to challenge the proposition that wage equations may omit 
elements of unobserved skill; regardless of the sign of d it is always 
possible that a particular empirical model suffers from a missing or inac- 
curately measured variable (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1993). But, for a 
given level of education, it is an empirical question as to whether unob- 
served white productive attributes exceed those of either African Ameri- 
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cans or Latinos. It is also an empirical question as to whether the AFQT 
or other standardized test scores accurately capture unobserved ability. 
For example, in a recent article which examines the interrelationships 
among individual wages, human capital, and psychological capital, viz. 
self-esteem and locus of control (which are usually unobserved vari- 
ables), Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity (1997) find that African Americans 
have a higher level of psychological capital. Including self-esteem and 
locus of control in the wage equation does not eliminate the influence of 
race on the hourly wage rate; otherwise identical African Americans 
receive lower pay than white workers. 
Furthermore, Rodgers (1994, 1997) shows that the general trend of 
rising skill prices is only a partial explanation of rising racial inequality 
among men. Similarly, Mason (1995a) shows that an increase in the 
extent of discrimination can explain nearly three-fourths of the increase 
in the male interracial residual earnings differential from 1975 to 1991. 
Currie and Thomas (1995) find that interracial differences in cognitive 
achievement vary according to the particular test given and that there are 
important interracial differences in the predictive power of the covariates 
of cognitive skill. For example, maternal education has a larger impact 
on the test scores of African American children than white children. 
Further, Currie and Thomas find (p. 3) that "the skills that are valued in 
the labor market are not necessarily the most valuable in terms of child 
development." Finally, Rodgers and Spriggs (1996) also demonstrate that 
as measures of unobserved ability, AFQT scores have measurement error 
that is correlated with race. After correcting for this source of measure- 
ment error, they do find that test scores have a positive correlation with 
the wage rate but the inclusion of error-corrected scores in the wage 
equation has little impact on the interracial wage differential. 
This article also examines the relationship between unobserved labor 
quality and the unexplained interracial wage differential. Rather than 
focusing on test scores, however, I restrict my attention to a model where 
skill is an endogenous outcome. From the educational ttainment and wage 
equations I then make inferences about interracial differences in labor 
quality and the extent of discrimination i competitive labor markets. 
This approach is motivated by a dramatic inconsistency between Afri- 
can American cultural folklore and the received wisdom among econo- 
mists. African American popular wisdom holds that "in order for an 
African American to be treated equally (s)he must be better." One inter- 
pretation of this maxim is that for a group whose median standard of 
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living is below the national average, catching up to the national average 
will require that its individual members put forward supra-normal levels 
of effort in skill accumulation. To the extent hat educational effort is 
positively correlated with work effort and that work effort is a compo- 
nent of "skill," measured interracial inequality may underestimate the 
true extent of discrimination. In short, there is no a priori reason to 
presume that adequately controlling for unobserved productive attributes 
will lower rather than raise the so-called unexplained interracial wage 
differential. 
There are at least three stylized facts which lend credence to this 
argument. First, for the entire post-slavery era African American years of 
schooling has tended to show annual increases relative to white years of 
schooling (Smith, 1984; Bernstein, 1995), even as the average level of 
education of both groups has been on an upward trend. Today, white 
males average less than six months more schooling than African Ameri- 
can males. Two, in recent decades, achievement scores of African Ameri- 
cans have increased relative to the achievement scores of whites (Jencks, 
1993:177-179; Bernstein, 1995). 3 Jaynes and Williams (1989:351-2) 
write: 
In sum, over the relatively short period from 1970 to 1980, the gap 
between average academic performance of white and black school 
children narrowed appreciably. The effects are visible for all levels 
of ability and for all types of communities. The data suggest that the 
largest impact was in rural areas. It is not possible to conclude from 
the evidence that achievement gains of black students are due simply 
to school desegregation or to programs initiated in the 1960s that 
were designed to increase educational opportunities for minority 
students. However, the results do present a challenge to commenta- 
tors who judge that those programs failed. (emphasis added) 
In short, although years of schooling and academic achievement (as mea- 
sured by standardized test scores) among African Americans are lower 
than among whites, African American growth in educational ttainment 
has outpaced white growth in these areas. And, this relatively faster 
growth cannot be attributed solely to interracial differences in the ben- 
efits of government policy. There is evidence then of a positive 
race-specific effect on educational ttainment associated with being an 
African American. This is precisely the longitudinal pattern one would 
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expect if supra-normal effort has become part of a culturally inspired 
group self-help strategy to move toward the median standard of living 
(Billingsley, 1992). 
Three, on average, whites have fewer institutional, social, and eco- 
nomic hurdles for increasing either years of schooling or academic achieve- 
ment han either Latinos or African Americans. For many commentators, 
it is not at all clear that these hurdles are diminishing over time. 4
Intergroup differences in educational effort--and its subsequent affect 
on labor market outcomes--has been long accepted as an explanation for 
the movement of white immigrants into the "middle class." For example, 
Taubman (1975:41) strongly argues that an above-average preference for 
education among Jews is a major determinant of Jewish economic suc- 
cess. Sowell (1975:144-146) also argues: 
Among the characteristics a sociated with success is a future orien- 
tation--a belief in a pattern of behavior that sacrifices present com- 
forts and enjoyments while preparing for future success . . . .  Those 
groups who [have had] this--the Jews, the Japanese-Americans, and 
the West Indian Negroes [sic]--for example, all came from social 
backgrounds in which this kind of behavior was common before 
they set foot on American soil. 
A high value on "fun," "excitement," and emotionalism has charac- 
terized the less successful minorities. (emphasis n original) 
Given the nearly universally accepted notion that the culture of white 
immigrants and ethnics has enabled these groups to achieve upward mo- 
bility through individual supra-normal "effort," it is at least a testable 
hypothesis that there are similar group culture-individual chievement 
links among racial minorities. There is after all an undemtilized body of 
literature (see Bemstein, 1995; and Haveman and Wolfe, 1994, for refer- 
ences) which suggests that for whites and African Americans of similar 
class (socioeconomic status) backgrounds, African Americans have higher 
probabilities of both graduating from high school and going on to 
postsecondary education and obtain more years of education. Utilizing 
the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, Haveman and Wolfe (1994: 170- 
173) report that African Americans (especially women) are more likely 
to graduate from high school than their white counterparts. Among men, 
they find no statistically significant difference in the probability of 
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postsecondary education across racial groups. Among women, African 
Americans have a substantially greater probability of going on to 
postsecondary education than white women of the same socioeconomic 
status. Similarly, utilizing the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, 
Maxwell (1995) found that African American men were more likely to 
attend college and achieved more years of schooling than white males of 
similar background. Additionally, after adjusting for social background, 
Maxwell found that there are no race-specific statistically significant 
differences in AFQT scores (which are often used as a measure of educa- 
tional achievement). 
Neither Maxwell nor Haveman and Wolfe includes Latinos in their 
sample. However, there is no reason to suspect that the interactions among 
race, class, and individual effort which inform African American-white 
differences in skill attainment are any less operative for Latino-white 
differences in skill attainment. Regardless of race, individuals from groups 
with a below-average standard of living may seek to utilize supra-normal 
effort as one strategy to move toward the median. 
If there is truly a positive or at least non-negative race-specific effect 
for educational ttainment, then why is the race-specific effect in wage 
equations uniformly negative? I argue that the link between these two 
outcomes can be found in the interrelationships among race, culture, and 
skill acquisition. Accordingly, this article has a two-part objective: to 
determine if effort, an unmeasured cultural attribute, differs across iden- 
tifiable social groups; and to determine if interracial patterns in differing 
effort levels are consistent with the claim that unexplained earnings dif- 
ferentials are evidence of discrimination. I will proceed by simultaneously 
examining the relationship between observed individual attributes and 
educational nd income attainment. 
STATISTICAL MODEL 
Consider the following modification of B owles's (1972) and Gdlliches's 
(1977) recursive model of educational ttainment and income. 5 
(1) S = txlE+e w, 
(2) E = XI3 + ez + el, and 
(3) W = Sy1, + Xy2 + e2, 
where S = skill, ew = work effort, e~ = education effort, E = educational 
attainment, W' = logarithmic wage rate, X -- social class background, 
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arid 51 > 0, ~ > 0, 'Y1 > 0, ~/2 > 0, Cov(X,eE) = Cov(X,ew) = 0, E(EI,E2) = 
0, and e4 - N(0,oi), where i = 1, 2. 
Skill has both a produced component, education, and a cultural com- 
ponent, "work effort." For a given level of education effort, individuals 
from higher social class backgrounds are able to obtain higher levels of 
education. In turn, Bowles argues that social class origins have both an 
indirect impact on income (through education) and a direct impact on 
income; hence, the distribution of income is ultimately determined by the 
class origins and efforts of individuals. 6 
As a rule we estimate (3') rather than (3), which does not provide a 
return to skill, = ~/lt~l r ~h. Additionally, the presence of work effort 
(ew)'l) in the error term implies ordinary least squares estimation of (3') 
will suffer from omitted variables bias since work effort is arguably 
correlated with educational ttainment and (I argue below) race. 
(3') W = E + X'~2 + I~, where N = ewe/1 , + I~ 2 
For example, suppose work effort is a positive and monotonic function 
of education effort. Without loss of generality we may write ew = eE = e. 
Now consider Graph 1. Let e = 0 represent the normal or average level of 
effort, emax represent the maximum effort possible for an individual, and 
emi n represent the minimum feasible level of effort associated with skill 
attainment. Let Ig/I (g = African American, Latino, or white) represent 
the relative income of a particular acial group. When Ig/I < 1 there is 
above average cultural pressure to achieve, "to uplift the race" and one- 
self. As Ig/I increases beyond 1 there is less group pressure to achieve 
and thereby one can act more individually. 
So, e = 50 + 81*f(Ig/I), where g 0 is the individual component of effort 
and 81*f(Ig/I) is the cultural component of effort. Given the sizable inter- 
racial differences in standards of living, racial identity is a natural proxy 
for f(Ig/I). Hence, the effort function may be written as e = S o + 81*race + 
e3, where race = 1 if the individual is Latino or African American and 0 
if the individual is white and e3 ~ N(0, t~3). (The observed variables [X] 
and the unobserved variable [e] are not correlated when X does not 
include race.) Given the effort function and the appropriate set of substi- 
tutions, the reduced form equations are: 
(2.1) E = 80 + XI3 + 81race + e3 + el 
= r-0 + Xg:l + 81race + ~h, where ~ includes 50 and the 
constant term from [3, and 
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GRAPH 1 
Individual Effort--Group Culture Function 
] 
( / /  Relatr~e Group Income (Ig/I) 
(3,1) W = ('ylO~lt0 + '~lt0) + X~(~/iol I + ]r + (~t la l l l  + ~'lil) race + 
('Y1e3 + e 2 + yl~lE3 + TIO~IEI) 
= r + Xr + ~2race + ~t z
The critical coefficient is ill, the race-specific effect (of African Ameri- 
cans and Latinos) on education, If the estimated value of 51 is < 0, then 
the results are inconsistent with the notion of relatively greater African 
American or Latino achievement effort. Since the marginal effect of 
education on skill (oh) and the marginal effect of skill on the wage rate 
(•1) are both positive, the sign of ~l provides a straightforward method of 
detecting the presence of wage discrimination. In a nondiscriminatory 
environment fl > (=) 0 implies t~2 > (=) 0. Empirical violations of this 
nondiscrimination condition allows one to determine the nature of the 
discriminatory process. A strong finding for the presence of wage dis- 
crimination may be said to exist if: i) t l  > 0 and (~2 < 0, or ii) i i  > 0 and 
r = 0. A weak finding for the presence of wage discrimination may be 
said to occur when tl  = 0 and 02 < 0. When 51 < 0 and ~2 < 0 it is not 
possible to distinguish between the effects of differential behavior across 
racial groups and differential interracial treatment in the educational nd 
earnings processes. The null hypotheses are t l  = 0 and (~2 = 0. 
Equations 2.1 and 3.1 are estimated separately. Ordinary least squares 
is used to estimate quation 3.1. Ordinary least squares is also used to 
estimate 2.1 when the dependent variable is years of education; however, 
both a bivariate probit model with sample selection and single equation 
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binomial probit models are used to estimate this equation when the de- 
pendent variable is whether or not the individual graduated from high 
school and whether or not the individual obtained any post-secondary 
education. 7 
The results how strong evidence of wage discrimination against Afri- 
can Americans and weak evidence of wage discrimination against Latinos. 
The results on African American-white differences ineducational ttain- 
ment are not novel. However, the discussion of Latino-white differences 
in the education and earnings processes does provide some empirical 
insight into an understudied area. The primary novelty of this article 
resides in its attempt to connect the educational ttainment process to the 
economics of discrimination. 
Data 
I use The 1990 Panel Study on Income Dynamics/Latino National 
Political Survey Early Release File to examine the educational nd in- 
come attainment of three groups of men: African Americans, Latinos, 
and whites, s Although the PSID/LNPS does not contain information on 
the characteristics of academic institutions attended by students, it does 
contain a rather ich set of family background variables which I exploit 
to determine the relationship among race, education and wage rates for 
the three groups of men. 9This is a sample of working age adult male 
heads of household. Observations with missing values, zero earnings, or 
wage rates greater than $100 per hour were deleted from the sample. The 
Latino data were collected in a 1990 survey, while all other data were 
collected in a 1989 survey. 
Table 1 lists the variables and their definitions. Educational ttainment 
is captured separately by years of education (EDUCATION) and the 
dichotomous outcomes, whether or not the individual graduated from 
high school (HIGHSCHL) and whether or not high school graduates 
have gone on to obtain any completed years of post-secondary education 
(COLLEGE). LOGWAGE, the income variable, is the average hourly 
wage rate for all labor earnings. 
AGE captures the lifecycle affects associated with educational ttain- 
ment. Given that educational ttainment takes time, age should be posi- 
tively correlated with educational ttainment. AGE also captures inter- 
temporal changes in the social conditions and institutions faced by differ- 
ent educational cohorts. If there has been a positive structural change for 
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LOGWAGE 
EDUCATION 
HIGHSCHL 
COLLEGE 
NRTHEAST 
NRTHCENT 
WEST 
WORKEXPR 
TENURE 
TENURE2 
AGE 
HEALTH 
MARRIED 
XJOB 1 
JOBUNION 
PARPOOR 
PARRICH 
TOPARENT 
EFA_LTHS 
EFA_GTHS 
EFA_DEG 
EMO_LTHS 
EMO_GTHS 
EMO_DEG 
PROJECTS 
HEADBROS 
HEADSIST 
GRADELAG 
FA_IMMIG 
FA_SOUTH 
MO_IMMIG 
TABLE 1 
Definition and Identification of Variables 
= natural ogarithm of annual abor earnings divided by 
annual hours worked 
= years of education, capped at 17 
= 1 if individual graduated from high school; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual graduated from high school and obtained 
postsecondary education; 0, if graduated from high school 
with no additional years of completed education 
= 1 individual ives in the Northeastern U.S.; 0, otherwise 
= 1 individual ives in the Northcentral U.S.; 0, otherwise 
= 1 individual ives in the Western U.S.; 0, otherwise 
= years of post age 18 work experience 
= number of months employed at present job 
= tenure squared 
= age of individual 
= 1 if individual's health limits the type or amount of work he 
can perform; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual is currently married; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if man works more than one job; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if job is unionized; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if parents were "poor" during childhood; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if parents were "pretty well olT' during childhood; 0, 
otherwise 
= 1 if individual ived with both parents most of the time until 
age 16; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if father did not complete high school; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if father has some post high school eduation; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if father obtained a college degree; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if mother did not complete high school; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if mother has some post high school eduation; 0, other 
wise 
= 1 if mother obtained a college degree; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual resides in a public housing project; 0, 
otherwise 
= number of brothers 
= number of sisters 
= 1 if the individual experienced grade delay; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if father was raised outside of the U.S.; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if father was raised in the South; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if mother was raised outside of the U.S.; 0, otherwise 
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MO_SOUTH 
HD_IMMIG 
HD_SOUTH 
GREWRURL 
FAPMT 
FABUSOWN 
CATHOLIC 
JEWISH 
MUSLIM 
NORELIGN 
MEXICAN 
CUBAN 
PRICAN 
OTHRLAT 
BROWN 
SPANDOMN 
ENGLDOMN 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
= 1 if mother was raised in the South; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual was raised outside of the U.S.; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual was raised in the South; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual was raised in a rural area; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if father was a professional, technical, or kindred worker; 
0, otherwise 
= 1 if father was a self-employed business owner; 0, other 
wise 
= 1 if individual is Catholic; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual is Jewish; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual is Muslim; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual has no religious affiliation; 0, otherwise 
= (LATINO) is of Mexican national origin; 0, 1 if individual 
otherwise 
1 if individual 
otherwise 
1 if individual 
otherwise 
(LATINO) is of Cuban national origin; 0, 
(LATINO) is of Puerto Rican origin; 0, 
= 1 if individual (LATINO) is not of Mexican, Cuban, or 
Puerto Rican origin; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual (LATINO) self-identified his race as 
"brown"; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual (LATINO) reported that Spanish is the 
language spoken at home all or most of the time, or if 
individual reported that he does speak English at all or 
speaks Spanish very poorly; 0, otherwise 
= 1 if individual (LATINO) reported that English is the 
language spoken at home all or most of the time, or if 
individual reported that he does speak Spanish at all or 
speaks Spanish very poorly; 0, otherwise 
younger cohorts, AGE may have a negative correlation with educational 
attainment. In the earnings equation, AGE represents potential experi- 
ence and is expected to have a positive effect on the wage rate. 
HEADBROS and HEADSIST capture the gender-specific effect of 
family size on educational attainment. Individuals from larger families 
have proportionately less social capital (or fewer resources) and thereby 
will have lower educational attainment. If parents have gender biases, 
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e.g., they favor boys' education over girls' education, then HEADBROS 
should have a larger (negative) impact on educational ttainment than 
HEADSIST (Pattnayak and Todorov, 1992; Taubman, 1991). 
Individuals from two-parent families (TOPARENT) have access to 
proportionately larger levels of social capital and therefore should obtain 
higher levels of education. Similarly, increases in the level of parental 
education (EFA_LTHS, EFA_GTHS, EFA_DEG, EMO_LTHS, 
EMO_GTHS, EMO DEG) imply a higher quality of social capital and is 
expected to raise educational ttainment. 
In comparison to middle income families, persons raised in poor house- 
holds have access to lower levels of social capital and other resources 
while those raised in upper income households have access to higher 
levels of social capital and other resources. Accordingly, PARPOOR 
should be negatively correlated with educational ttainment while we 
expect PARRICH to be positively correlated with educational attain- 
ment. 
Father's occupation (FAPMT, FABUSOWN) provides an additional 
direct measure of social background. 
Fligstein and Fernandez (1985) argue that age-based grade delay 
(GRADELAG) is negatively correlated with educational ttainment. How- 
ever, there is some ambivalence r garding the causal interpretation f the 
coefficient on GRADELAG. Individuals may experience grade delay 
because of personal shortcomings, institutional bias, suboptimal 
individual-institutional p iring, or social class (background) disadvan- 
tages. Any one of these items would reduce ducational ttainment and 
all of them may have a greater or lesser ole in explaining rade delay. 
Lastly, grade delay may indicate lower acquired cognitive skills and 
hence should have a negative correlation with income. 
Among others, Rodgers, Spriggs, and Waaler (1997) show that among 
15-18-year-olds in 1980, at each age, African Americans have less years 
of schooling than whites. The regression equations adjust these gross 
interracial differences in outcomes for all observable differences in age, 
social capital, and socioeconomic status. Hence, including GRADELAG 
in the wage and education equations allows us to control for unobserved 
individual-specific (ability, motivation, etc.) and institutional (quality of 
school) differences which influence arnings and educational ttainment. 
GREWRURL controls for possible intraregional differences inresources 
available to educational institutions. Specifically, if rural locations are 
characterized by fewer resources per student (and therefore provide a 
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relatively lower quality of education) we may expect hat men raised in 
rural areas will have lower educational ttainment. 
By including HD_IMMIG and HD_SOUTH I also recognize that in- 
ternational nd interregional differences, respectively, in educational t- 
tainment may occur because of interregional nd international differ- 
ences in resources, culture, potential differences in expected rates of 
return to education, and the cost of education. 
Moreover, the quality of social capital derived from parents may vary 
according to interregional nd international differences in where parents 
were raised; hence, our inclusion of FA_IMMIG, FA SOUTH, 
MO_IMMIG, and MQSOUTH. For example, the social capital of immi- 
grant parents (the omitted category) may be of lower quality than that of 
parents raised in the Northeastern U.S. or greater than the quality of 
social capital of parents raised in the South. 
Both the wage and education equations include religious affiliation 
variables (CATHOLIC, JEWISH, MUSLIM, NORELIGN) as additional 
controls for social capital.I~ 
The wage equation also includes contemporary region controls 
(NRTHEAST, NRTHCENT, WEST), health status (HEALTH), union 
status (JOBUNION), marital status (MARRIED), residential location 
(PROJECTS), multiple jobs (XJOBI), and the number of months on the 
job and its square (TENURE, TENURE2). 
I follow Bean and Teinda (1987) in recognizing that Latino educa- 
tional and income attainment is not invariant across national origin. 
Thereby, I have included MEXICAN, CUBAN, PRICAN, and OTHRLAT 
to control for national origin differences among Latinos. BROWN allows 
us to control for racial differences among Latinos, while ENGLDOMN 
and SPANDOMN control for varying degrees of language fluency. 
Finally, AFRICAN is a dichothomous variable for whether or not the 
individual is an African American. 
Tables 2 lists the variable means. Mean African American and Latino 
wages are 0.31 and 0.29 log points, respectively, less than the mean of 
white wages. Whites have an average of 13.37 years of education, while 
Latinos and African Americans have averages of 10.79 and 12.12 years 
of education, respectively. The educational differential between ative-bom 
and immigrant Latinos (3.76 years) exceeds the differential between whites 
and Latinos (2.78 years), while the wage differential is about the same 
(0.26 log points). 
Approximately 1/2 of all whites were raised in middle income house- 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Means, by Race and Latino Birth Origin 
Latmo Latino Latino 
African White All Imm=grant Native-Born 
VARIABLE (610) (1688) (885) (538) (347) 
LOGWAGE 2.23 2.54 2.25 2 10 2.36 
EDUCATION 12.12 13.37 10.79 8.62 12.38 
HIGHSCHL 0.7581 0.8642 0.6235 0.3545 0.8148 
COLLEGE 0.3193 0.5019 0.2896 0 1349 0.4038 
NRTHEAST 0.0772 0.2110 0.1035 0.1296 0.0843 
NRTHCENT 0.1458 0.2686 0.0998 0.1002 0.0995 
WEST 0.0544 0.1714 0.5700 05449 0.5886 
TENURE 99 94 83 82 84 
TENURE2 19239 18651 14211 13123 15014 
AGE 36.95 38.21 38.00 40.04 36.48 
HEALTH 0.1017 0.0977 0 0989 0 1253 0.0794 
MARRIED 0.8275 0.8963 0.9321 0.9258 0.9368 
X JOB1 0.1606 0.2095 0.1554 0.0627 0.2239 
JOBUNION 0.2930 0.1977 03098 0.2618 03452 
PARPOOR 0.5235 0.2274 0.5701 0.6541 0.5080 
PARRICH 0.1948 0.2473 0.1422 0.1181 0 1599 
TOPARENT 0.6524 0.8262 0 7632 0.8100 0.7287 
EFA_LTHS 0.6526 0.4070 0.7349 0.8630 0 6403 
EFA_GTHS 0.0191 0.0999 0.0297 0.0062 0.0470 
EFA_DEG 0.0274 0.1201 0.0287 0 0321 0.0261 
EMO_LTHS 0.5752 0.3003 0.7271 0.8833 0.6118 
EMO_GTHS 0.0500 0.1028 0.0414 00083 0.0658 
EMO_DEG 0.0266 0.0945 0.0227 0.0109 0.0314 
PROJECTS 0.0574 0.0103 0.0349 0.0522 0.0221 
HEADBROS 3.0602 1.6579 2.9716 3.4821 2.5947 
HEADSIST 2.9724 1.4710 2.5987 2.9426 2.3448 
GRADELAG 0.3196 0.1293 0.3793 0.5874 0.2257 
FA_IMMIG 0.0621 0.0821 0.5818 0.9815 0.2868 
FA SOUTH 0.8466 0.2976 0.1649 0.0067 0.2817 
MO_IMMIG 0.0373 0.0702 0.5414 0.9636 0.2297 
MO_SOUTH 0.8872 0.2956 0.1766 0.0026 03050 
HD IMMIG 0.0194 0.0215 0.4247 n.a. n.a. 
HD_SOUTH 0.7734 0.2918 0.1369 n.a 0.2380 
GREWRURL 0.2131 0.1892 0.1733 0.2620 0.1078 
FAPMT 0.0280 0.1986 0.0657 0.0789 0.0560 
FABUSOWN 0.0103 0.0333 0.0319 00444 0.0227 
CATHOLIC 0.0580 0.2609 0.7915 0.8056 0 7811 
JEWISH 0.0002 0.0198 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 
MUSLIM 0.0073 00057 0.0007 0.0017 0.0000 
NORELIGN 0.0805 0.0939 0.0477 0.0386 0.0544 
MEXICAN n.a n.a. 0 7212 0.6545 0.7704 
CUBAN n.a. n.a. 0.0534 0 1079 0.0133 
PRICAN n.a. n.a. 0.1274 0.1347 0.1220 
OTHRLAT n.a. n a 0 0980 0.1029 0.0944 
BROWN n.a. n.a 0.3380 0.2875 0.3753 
SPANDOMN n.a. n.a 0.1415 0.3129 0.0149 
ENGLDOMN n.a. n.a. 0.1370 0.0441 0.2056 
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holds, while well over one-half of African Americans and over three- 
fifths of Latinos were raised in poor households. Among all groups, 
African Americans were the least likely to have been raised in a two- 
parent home (65 percent) and whites were the most likely (83 percent), 
while Latinos were in the middle (76 percent). 
The parents of African Americans and Latinos are considerably ess 
educated than the parents of whites. Similarly, white men were raised in 
smaller families than African Americans and Latinos and they have an 
average age one year greater than African Americans and two years 
greater than native-born Latinos. 
Thirty-eight percent of Latinos experience grade delay, versus under 32 
percent and 13 percent of African Americans and whites, respectively.ll 
At least 85 percent of African Americans' parents were raised in the 
South, while 54-58 percent of Latinos' parents were raised outside of the 
continental United States. These patterns are moderated among the cur- 
rent generation. Seventy-seven percent of African American men were 
raised in the South and 43 percent of Latinos were raised outside of the 
continental United States. 
Among Latinos, immigrant men come from larger families, have lower 
income and more poorly educated parents, but are more likely to come 
from two-parent households than native-born men. Not surprisingly, im- 
migrant men are much more likely than native-bom en to be Spanish 
dominant (31 percent versus 1.5 percent) and much less likely to be 
English dominant (4.5 percent versus 21 percent). However, these differ- 
ences in English-speaking ability do not imply that native-born Latinos 
are more assimilative. About 65 percent of immigrants are bilingual, 
while 78 percent of native-born Latinos are bilingual. Further evidence 
that native-born men are less assimilative than immigrants can be gauged 
from racial identification: 29 percent of immigrants describe themselves 
as brown, while 38 percent of native-born men describe themselves a  
brown; 71 percent of immigrants describe themselves a white, while 62 
percent of native-born men describe themselves a white. 
Table 3 presents the results when years of education is used as the 
measure of educational ttainment. The first set of results are for the 
complete sample of men. The second set of results are for a restricted 
sample of only native-born men. Over 42 percent of Latinos are 
foreign-born, versus under 2 percent of African Americans and whites. 
Beyond the aforementioned differences between ative and immigrant 
Latinos, both the Latino income and educational ttainment processes 
20 The Review of Black Political Economy/Winter 1997 
TABLE 3 
Completed Years of Education 
FuXi Sample 
Eduatton 12.86 
R2 0.3431 
Adj R2 O.3365 
Log-L -8214 
Rest Log-L -8883 
N 3183 
VARIABLE BETA t-STAT 
CONSTANT 14 1300 72.71 
PARPOOR -0.4169 o4 13 
PARRICH -0 0076 -0 07 
TOPARENT 0.0566 0 57 
EFA_LTHS -0.5744 -5 69 
EFA_GTHS 0.2849 1 66 
EFA_DEG 0.6080 3.23 
EMO_LTHS -0.4149 -4.09 
EMO_GTHS 0.5248 3.39 
EMO_DEG 0.5429 2.96 
AGE 0 0012 0.29 
HEADBROS -0 0321 -1,44 
HEADSIST -0,1084 -4.32 
GRADELAG -1 6908 -15.78 
FA_IMMIG 0.0227 0 12 
FA_SOUTH -0.1091 -0.61 
MO_IMMIG 0.0922 0.44 
MO_SOUTH -0 3515 -2.01 
HD_IMMIG -1,2532 -5.23 
HD_SOUTH -0.0235 -0.15 
GREWRURL -0 4390 -4.18 
FAPMT 0.4334 3 12 
FABUSOWN 0 9028 3 70 
CATHOLIC -0.1572 -1.46 
JEWISH 1.2509 3.55 
MUSLIM 2.5928 4 92 
NORELIGN -0 4223 -2 93 
AFRICAN 0 1789 1 49 
MEXICAN -1.1240 -4 63 
CUBAN -0.0725 -0 11 
PRICAN -0.0652 -0.15 
OTHRLAT 1.7955 3.78 
BROWN -0 4464 -1.44 
LATINO n.a. 
Full Sample Native-Born Native-Born 
Eduatlon 12,86 EduaUon 12 99 Eduation 12 99 
R2 0.3353 R2 0 3141 R2 0.3128 
Adj R2 0.3291 Adl R2 0.3058 Adj R2. 0.3052 
Log-L -8233 Log-L -6364 Log-L -6363 
Rest Log-L -8883 Rest Log-L -6850 Rest Log-L -6850 
N 3183 N 2580 N 2580 
BETA t-STAT BETA t-STAT BETA t-STAT 
14.0840 72 23 13.8950 67.65 13.8830 67.64 
-0.4115 -4.06 -0.4133 -3.87 -0 4135 -3 87 
0.0069 0.07 -0 0030 -0 03 0 0012 0,01 
0 0663 0 67 0 1077 1.03 0.1074 1.02 
-0 5845 -5.76 -0.5566 -5.24 -0.5536 -5 21 
0 2991 1.73 0 2929 1 65 0 3023 1 70 
0 6003 3.17 0.5744 2.92 0 5644 2 86 
-04399 -4 32 -04239 ~ -0.4334 -4 06 
0 5023 3 23 0 4772 2 94 0 4694 2 90 
0.5579 3 02 0,5858 3.07 0.5978 3.13 
0 0022 0.53 0.0028 0.64 0.0030 0.68 
-0 0335 -1.50 -0.0173 -0 73 -0.0165 -0.70 
-0 1107 -4.40 -0 1131 -4.26 -0.1143 -4.31 
-1 6746 -15.54 -1.7041 -14 77 -1.6997 -14 73 
0.0729 0.38 0.0725 0 36 0.0643 0 32 
-0 1040 -0.58 -0 1022 -055 -0.1062 -057 
00816 039 0.2108 094 02149 096 
-0.3564 -2,02 -0 3631 -1 99 -0 3579 -1 96 
-1.2177 -5.09 n a. n.a 
-0 0071 -0 05 0.0305 0,19 0.0369 0.23 
-04419 -4.19 -0.3470 -3,11 -0.3436 -3.08 
0 4542 3.26 0.4593 3.16 0 4672 3.22 
0.9012 3.68 0.7949 3 08 0 7887 3 05 
-0.1 540 -1.52 -0.0445 -039 -00424 -037 
1.2281 3 46 1 3306 3.65 1 3297 3.65 
2 5771 4 87 2 3627 3 98 2 3710 4 O0 
-0 4074 -2 81 -0 4330 -2.54 -0.4224 -2.77 
0 1878 1 56 0 1907 1.52 0.1909 1.52 
na  -00145 -0,05 ha. 
n a -0 8811 -032 n.a. 
n a 0.0641 0,11 n.a 
n.a 1.4462 2 26 n a 
-08113 -2 66 -0.6816 -1.67 -0.8139 -2 02 
-05338 -2 42 na 01761 067 
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may have a crucial missing variable--whether or not the individual is a 
legal worker in the United States. There is no way of identifying legal 
status within the data. 12 Presumably, the model will predict less well for 
undocumented persons because they have less access to resources and 
social opportunities and are much more vulnerable to discrimination. 
There are some similarities in the two sets of results: a positive 
race-specific effect for Other Latinos, a negative race-specific effect for 
Brown Latinos (especially when national origin is excluded), and no 
statistically significant effect for men of Cuban or Puerto Rican origin. 
The coefficient for Mexican Americans is small, negative, and insignifi- 
cant in the native-born sample but becomes considerably arger and sig- 
nificant in the full sample; hence, immigrant Mexican Americans do less 
well than native-born Mexican Americans or other Latino and Non-Latino 
social groups. Finally, the race-specific effect for African Americans is 
large and positive, but not significant. 
When Latinos are identified without regard to national origin, there is 
no significant race-specific effect among the native-born but there is 
more than a one-half grade effect in the full sample. When Latinos are 
identified by race and national origin there is a negative ffect for Brown 
Latinos, but the coefficient in the full sample is insignificant and the 
coefficient in the native-born sample is only marginally significant. Col- 
lectively, these patterns uggest a negative race-specific effect among 
immigrant Latinos of Mexican national origin and brown Latinos, a posi- 
tive race-specific effect among Other Latinos, but no race-specific effect 
on educational ttainment for all other groups of Latinos. 
As a measure of educational ttainment, years of education does not 
control for significant threshold events, such as whether or not the indi- 
vidual graduated from high school. Given the substantial cost differential 
between secondary and post-secondary schooling, it is entirely possible 
that the unconditional impact of race-specific effects may decline as 
years of schooling increases. Focusing then on mean years of education 
may cloud one's understanding of what happens at various critical points 
along the distribution of educational outcomes. 
Consider then Tables 4 and 5. These tables present the bivariate probit 
with sample selection results for the full and native-born samples, re- 
spectively. Since the value of rho for these quations i statistically insig- 
nificant, I have also estimated the HIGHSCHL and COLLEGE equations 
as separate binomial probit models. The latter results are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7. 
22 The Review of Black Political Economy/Winter 1997 
TABLE 4 
Probabilities of Graduation from High School and Obtaining 
Postsecondary Education: Full Sample, Bivariate Probit Specification 
Log-L -2644 Log-L -2650 
N 3183 N 3183 
Highschl College Highschl College 
VARIABLE BETA t-STAT BETA t-STAT BETA t-STAT BETA t-STAT 
CONSTANT 2 3090 16.06 -0,3327 -2,35 2,2923 16 03 -0 3512 -2 52 
PARPOOR -03147 -4.16 0.0411 0.52 -0.3112 -4.13 00545 070 
PARRICH -0.0946 -0.94 -0.0227 -0,32 -0.0931 -0 93 -0 0185 -0.26 
TOPARENT 0 2158 2.88 -0.0541 -0.77 0.2230 2.98 -0 0541 -0 78 
EFA_LTHS -0.1415 -1.71 -0.3203 -4 69 -0.1463 -1.78 -0 3142 -4 57 
EFA_GTHS 0.1604 0.70 0 3909 3 53 0.1705 0.74 0 3931 3 55 
EFA_DEG 0.4126 0.92 0 5119 4.08 0 4424 1.09 0 5102 4 06 
EMO_LTHS -0.3263 -4.23 -0 1928 -2.40 -0.3338 -4 34 -0.1886 -2 34 
EMO_GTHS 0.5557 2.28 0.3112 3 10 0.5441 2.23 0.3011 3 01 
EMO DEG 0.5976 1 23 0.5275 4 16 0 6325 1.45 0.5249 4 14 
AGE -0.0144 -4.83 0.0183 5 54 -0.0142 -4.80 0.0187 5 95 
HEADBROS -0.0259 -1 63 -0 0062 -0 36 -0.0263 -1 65 -0.0056 -0 33 
HEADSIST -0 0692 -3.70 -0,6378 -1 93 -0 0695 -3 73 -0 0360 -1 83 
GRADELAG -0.9808 -14.38 -0,3381 -1 93 -0.9703 -14 30 -0 2981 -1.74 
FA IMMIG 0.0093 0 05 0.0748 0 58 0.0373 0,19 0 0807 0 62 
FA_SOUTH -0,0628 -0.35 0.0875 0,75 -0.0489 -027 0.0913 0 78 
MO IMMIG -0 0225 -0.10 -0,0332 -0,24 -0.0509 -0.23 -0 0476 -0.35 
MO_SOUTI- -0.1334 -0.72 -0,3760 -3,42 -0.1440 -0.77 -0.3749 -3 40 
HD_IMMIG -0 4725 -2,69 0.1650 0 90 -0.4373 -2.56 0.2024 1 14 
HD_SOUTH -0.1628 -1.41 0.2102 1.96 -0.1635 -1.42 0.2178 2.05 
GREWRURI -0.1962 -2.54 -0 1175 -1.50 -0.1956 -2 54 -0.1088 -1.40 
FAPMT 0 0296 0.20 0 1750 1.94 0 0410 0.28 0.1763 1 96 
FABUSOW~ 0 6473 2.13 0 4125 2.36 0.6496 2.14 0.3932 2 25 
CATHOLIC 0.0502 0.50 -0 1619 -2.29 0 0454 0.46 -0.1577 -2.26 
JEWISH 1 4867 0.73 0 9503 2 69 1 4603 0.77 0.9503 2 67 
MUSLIM 1.7050 1.28 0 8063 2.37 1 6768 1.30 0.7789 2.29 
NORELIGN -0.3825 -3.33 -0.2567 -2 39 -0 3798 -3 31 -0 2451 -2,30 
AFRICAN 0.3416 3 92 0 0529 0 53 0.3448 3.95 0 0427 0 43 
MEXICAN -0.2592 -1.49 0 0744 0.44 n.a n a. 
CUBAN 0.1543 0 31 -0,0451 -0.10 n,a n.a. 
PRICAN 0.0456 0 16 0 0313 0.11 n a n.a, 
OTHRLAT 0.9387 2.27 0.5174 1 46 n a. n.a. 
BROWN -0.0829 -0 41 0 0430 0 18 -0 2022 -1.01 -0.0117 -0 05 
LATINO n a n a -0 0684 -0 42 0 1372 0 95 
RHO(1,2) -0 0197 -0 06 -0.0985 -0 30 
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TABLE 5 
Probabilities of Graduation from High School and Obtaining Postsecondary 
Education: Native-Born Sample, Bivariate Probit Specification 
Bivariate 
Log-L o2142 
N 2580 
Highschl 
VARIABLE BETA t-STAT 
CONSTANT 2.2772 14.19 
PARPOOR -0.3641 -4.28 
PARRICH -0.1116 -0.98 
TOPARENT 0.2238 2.62 
EFA_LTHS -0.1186 -1,29 
EFA_GTHS 0.1640 0.73 
EFA_DEG 0,3514 0.63 
EMO_LTHS -0,3488 -4.09 
EMO_GTHS 0,5366 1.97 
EMO_DEG 0.6434 1.10 
AGE -0 0143 -4.22 
HEADBROS -0.0187 -1.04 
HEADSIST -0.0751 -3.52 
GRADELAG -0.9890 -12.79 
FA_IMMIG 0.0582 0,26 
FA_SOUTH -0,0650 -0,32 
MO_IMMIG 0.0544 0.21 
MO SOUTH -0.1239 -0.59 
HD_SOUTH -0.1666 -1.30 
GREWRURL -0.1535 -1.76 
FAPMT 0.0370 0,22 
FABUSOWN 0.6284 1.70 
CATHOLIC 0 0727 0.64 
JEWISH n.a. 
MUSLIM n.a. 
NORELIGN -0,4365 -3.37 
AFRICAN 0.3792 3.97 
MEXICAN 0.1752 0.79 
CUBAN 0.1462 0.07 
PRICAN 0.2434 0.60 
OTHRLAT 0.4772 0.70 
BROWN -0.2633 -0.91 
LATINO n.a 
RHO(1,2) 
Log-L -2145 
N 2580 
College Htghschl College 
BETA I-STAT BETA I-STAT BETA t-STAT 
-0.3976 -2.59 2 2783 14 23 -0.4086 -2 68 
0 0751 0 86 -0 3644 -4 30 0.0801 0.92 
-0 0016 -0 02 -0 1114 -0.98 0.0007 0.01 
-0.0246 -0.32 0.2240 2.63 -0.0229 -0 30 
-0.3178 -4.22 -0.1184 -1.30 -03136 -4 17 
0.3858 3.18 0.1858 0.74 0.3894 3 22 
0.5009 3 63 0.3453 0 63 0.4960 3 60 
-0 1782 -1 97 -03491 -4 10 -0.1818 -2 02 
0 2912 2.64 0 5376 1.97 0.2853 2 59 
0 5245 3 76 0 6623 1.15 0 5312 3 82 
0 0189 5 45 -0.0143 -4.25 0 0191 5.55 
-0.0049 -0.26 -0.0164 -1.02 -0 0051 -0.27 
-0.0314 -1.41 -0 0753 -3.63 -0.0320 -1 44 
-0.3106 -1.57 -0 9877 -12.79 -0.2955 -1.51 
01112 077 00577 0.26 0.1123 0.78 
0.1064 0 83 -0 0626 -0.31 0 1100 0.86 
-0 0882 -0 56 0.0569 0.22 -0.0880 -0 57 
-0 4091 -3.36 -0.1226 -0.59 -0 4018 -3 31 
0.2427 2 05 -0 1701 -1.33 0.2420 2 07 
-0.1142 -1.36 -0 1519 -1.74 -0 1075 -1.29 
0.1660 1 67 00374 022 01697 1 72 
0.3817 1.98 0,6264 1.70 0.3735 1 93 
-0 1432 -1 64 0.0719 0.63 -0.1395 -1 81 
0.9668 2 48 n.a. 0 9709 2 48 
0 7367 2 06 n.a 0.7380 2 07 
-0.2168 -1 80 -0.4352 -3.37 -0.2065 -1 73 
0.0428 0 39 0.3788 3.96 0 0399 0 37 
0 1287 0.66 n.a n.a 
-0.1022 -0.09 n a n.a 
0.1534 0.40 na n.a 
1.5130 2.52 n a n.a 
0.0323 0.12 -0 2820 -0 98 -0.0643 -0 31 
na 02150 1 01 02682 1 51 
-0 1570 -0 43 -0.1790 -0.50 
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The patterns here add detail to the results obtained when educational 
attainment is measured by years of education. Examining the results for 
the bivariate probit specifications (Tables 4 and 5), African Americans 
are more likely to graduate from high school than otherwise identical 
whites; however, the relative impact of supra-normal effort among Afri- 
can Americans is positive but not statistically significant in the COL- 
LEGE equation. For the single equation estimates of the COLLEGE 
equation, the coefficient on AFRICAN is larger than in the respective 
bivariate probit specification and it is statistically significant, even though 
the magnitude of the AFRICAN coefficient is nearly the same across the 
bivariate and single equation procedures for estimating the HIGHSCHL 
equation. From the binomial probit equations, African Americans are 6- 
7 percent more likely than whites to graduate from high school and 5-6 
percent more likely to obtain post-secondary education (given that they 
have graduated from high school). 
These results suggest that supra-normal effort does increase the prob- 
ability an African American will graduate from high school, and among 
those who have graduated from high school there is a relatively greater 
probability of attaining post-secondary education. The positive 
race-specific effect for African Americans however is not sufficient o 
overcome the impact of a more disadvantageous socioeconomic back- 
ground (compared to white males), especially since the positive covari- 
ance between the cost of education and years of education implies that 
the impact of culture on education (supra-normal effort) will become 
attenuated athigher levels of education. When one examines, therefore, 
mean years of education rather than alternative points of the distribution 
of educational ttainment, the race-specific effect for African Americans 
appears omewhat muted. 
Regardless of the estimation procedure, there are no race-specific ef- 
fects for men of Mexican, Cuban, or Puerto Rican origin, although nearly 
all of the coefficients are positive (when the sample is restricted to 
native-born men). For Other Latinos, there are positive and statistically 
significant race effects in both the bivariate and single equation specifi- 
cations and for both the full and native-born samples. The coefficient on 
BROWN is statistically insignificant, regardless of statistical specifica- 
tion and whether or not immigrants are included in the sample. 
For Latinos, I draw the following conclusions from the ordinary least 
squares and probit specifications of the educational ttainment process. 
Among the native-born and for a given level of resources, Latinos as an 
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undifferentiated group are likely to obtain the same level of education as 
white men; although, Other Latinos are likely to obtain a higher level of 
education than whites, this is especially so for post-secondary education. 
When immigrants are included in the sample, immigrant (but not native) 
Mexican Americans are likely to obtain a lower level of education than 
white men, while Other Latinos are likely to obtain a higher level of 
education. Finally, for Brown Latinos the results are indeterminate. The 
probit specifications show no effect, regardless of specification or sample; 
however, the coefficient on BROWN is negative in each of the high 
school graduation equations and often positive in each of the 
post-secondary education equations. The ordinary least squares pecifica- 
tion shows that the BROWN coefficient is negative and quite significant 
when national origin is omitted. Perhaps the latter results imply that 
Brown Latinos face considerable challenges graduating from high school, 
but once they have graduated they tend to do as well or better than whites 
in the education process. 
Moreover, BROWN is a self-identified and residual category. After 
giving their national origin, sample respondents were queried on their 
racial identity. Nearly two-thirds of Latino respondents self-identified as 
"white." All other responses were coded as "brown," although the re- 
sponses ranged from political (Chicano), to descriptive (olive, black, 
brown, light-skinned, etc.), to national origin, to ethnic (Latino Indian, 
Mestizo, Cholo, Pocho), to "other." One clear commonality among these 
terms is a desire to self-identify as "not white." And, as is indicated in 
Table 2, nearly 38 percent of native-born Latinos self-identify as brown 
while only 17 percent of foreign-born Latinos self-identify as brown. 
This pattern of self-identification among Latinos may reflect a certain 
degree of alienation or non-assimilation, and this alienation appears to 
increase with the Americanization f Latinos. Hence, this non-assimilation 
may be a response to discrimination against Latinos. Accordingly, the 
interpretation f the coefficient on BROWN remains uncertain. 
Table 8 contains four estimates of equation 3.1. There are two equa- 
tions each for the full and native-born samples. For both samples, there is 
one equation which considers Latinos as an aggregate and one which 
differentiates Latinos by national origin. 
For each equation, the coefficient on AFRICAN is negative and sig- 
nificant. This is precisely the opposite of what would expect in a dis- 
crimination-free nvironment since African Americans have a positive 
race-specific effect in the educational ttainment process. This represents 
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TABLE 8 
Reduced Form LOGWAGE Regressions, 
Full and Native-Born Samples (All Men) 
Full Sample Full Sample Native-Born 
Logwage 2.44 Logwag~ 2.44 Logwage 2.45 
R2 0,3503 R2 0.3498 R2 0.3453 
Adj R2 0.3414 Adj R2 0,3415 Adj R2 0.3345 
Log-L -3506 Log-L -3507 Log-L -2679 
Rest Log-L -4192 Rest Log-L -4192 Rest Log-L -3225 
N 3183 N 3183 N 2580 
VARIABLE BETA t-STAT BETA t-STAT BETA t-STAT 
CONSTANT 1.8426 30.95 1.8408 30.94 1.8637 27.95 
NRTHEAST 0.1600 4.51 0.1661 4.73 0.1391 3.49 
NRTHCENT -0.0070 -0.21 -0.0058 -0.18 -0.0279 -0.76 
WEST 0.1265 3.69 0.1220 3.59 0.1181 3.02 
TENURE 0.0036 14.39 0.0036 14.41 0.0035 12.91 
TENURE,?. -0.000006 -8.28 -0.000006 -8 .31  -0.000006 -7.51 
AGE 0.0118 10.96 0.0119 11.03 0.0115 9.45 
HEALTH -0.1970 -6.45 -0.1964 -6.43 -0.1860 -5.46 
MARRIED1 0.1066 3.70 0.1070 3.72 0.1040 3.28 
X JOB1 -0.0047 -0.20 -0.0037 -0.16 -0.0005 -0.02 
JOBUNION 0.1029 4.53 0,1030 4.54 0,1028 4.07 
PARPOOR -0.0781 -3.38 -0.0783 -3.39 -0.0691 -2.68 
PARRICH -0.0353 -1.49 -0.0348 -1.47 -0.0382 -1.45 
TOPARENT 0.0026 0.12 0.0020 0.09 0.0076 0.30 
EFA_LTHS -0.1003 -4.34 -0.1011 -4.38 -0.1018 -3.98 
EFA GTHS 0.0181 0,46 0.0186 0.47 0.0122 0.29 
EFA_DEG 0.0843 1.95 0,0846 1.96 0.0571 1.20 
EMO_LTHS -0.1002 -4.30 -0.1006 -4.32 -0.1008 -3.90 
EMO_GTHS -0.0417 -1.17 -0.0416 -1.17 -0.0521 -1.33 
EMO_DEG -0.0280 -0,66 -0.0276 -0,66 -0.0258 -0.56 
PROJECTS -0.2120 -3.55 -0.2077 -3.48 -0.2239 -3.34 
HEADBROS 0.0047 0.92 0.0047 0.93 0,0043 0.76 
HEADSIST o0.0100 -1.74 -0,0100 -1.75 -0,0072 -1.12 
GRADELAG -0.2045 -8,29 -0.2040 -8.28 -0,2194 -7.84 
FA IMMIG -0.0651 -1.48 -0.0614 -1.40 -0.0466 -0.95 
FA SOUTH 0.0355 0.87 0.0367 0.90 0.0310 0.69 
MO_IMMIG 0.1528 3.18 0.1585 3.31 0.1637 3.00 
MO_SOUTH -0.0532 -1.32 -0.0523 -1.30 -0.0686 -1.55 
HD_IMMIG -0.1241 -2.19 -0.1255 -2.23 n.a. 
HD_SOUTH -0.0094 -0.23 -0.0105 -0.26 -0.0018 -0.04 
GREWRURL -0.1370 -5.67 -0.1375 -5.70 -0.1421 -5.27 
FAPMT 0.0452 1.42 0.0450 1.42 0.0550 1.57 
FABUSOWN -0.0277 -0.50 -0.0274 -0.49 -0.0504 -0.81 
CATHOLIC 0.0794 3.11 0.0754 2.98 0.0945 3.33 
JEWISH 0.2433 3.00 0.2401 2.97 0.2507 2.84 
MUSLIM 0.1761 1.46 0.1747 1.45 0.2573 1.80 
NORELIGN -0.0566 -1.69 -0.0562 -1.68 -0.0567 -1.53 
AFRICAN -0.0966 -3.47 -0.0972 -3.50 -0.0964 -3.15 
MEXICAN -0.1316 -2.25 n.a. -0.1032 -1.43 
CUBAN -0.0739 -0.49 n.a. 0.1133 0.28 
PRICAN 0.0144 0.14 n.a. -0.0209 -0.14 
OTHRLAT -0.0678 -0.62 n.a. 0.0752 0.49 
BROWN -0.2076 -2.92 -0.2188 -3.15 -0.2664 -2.70 
SPANDOMN -0.1346 -1.36 -0.1420 -1.44 -0.3601 -0.96 
LATINO n.a. -0.0977 -1.88 n.a. 
Native-Born 
Logwage 
R2 
Adj R2 
Log-L 
Rest Log-L 
N 
BETA 
1.8623 
0.1408 
-0.0276 
0.1160 
0.0035 
-0.000006 
0,0115 
-0.1861 
0.1044 
0.0014 
0,1029 
-0.0692 
-0.0372 
0.0075 
-0.1017 
0.0130 
0.0559 
-0.1017 
-0,0522 
-0.0242 
-0,2242 
0.0043 
-0.0074 
-0.2185 
-0.0442 
0.0311 
0,1681 
-0.0683 
n.a. 
-0.0012 
-0.1419 
0.0557 
-0,0513 
0.0936 
0.2493 
0.2577 
-0,0556 
-0.0963 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-0.2828 
-0.3520 
-0.0665 
2.45 
0.3449 
0.3348 
-2679 
-3225 
2580 
t-STAT 
27.94 
3.55 
-0.75 
2.97 
12.92 
-7.52 
9.45 
-5.46 
3.30 
0.06 
4.07 
-2.69 
-1.42 
0.30 
-3.98 
0.30 
1.18 
-3.94 
-1.33 
-0.53 
-3.35 
0.76 
-1.15 
-7.81 
-0.91 
0.70 
3.10 
-1.54 
-0.03 
-5.27 
1.59 
-0.83 
3.32 
2.83 
1.80 
-1.50 
-3.14 
-2.91 
-0.92 
-1.02 
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a strong f'mding of wage discrimination i  the labor market. Also, regard- 
less of the sample, the coefficient on MEXICAN is negative, but it is 
significant only in the full sample. (If BROWN is omitted from the 
regression the coefficient on MEXICAN is also significant and negative 
in the native-born sample.) The negative sign on MEXICAN when immi- 
grants are included in the sample is consistent with the negative 
race-specific effect in educational ttainment when immigrants are in- 
cluded. However, for native-born Mexican Americans there is no 
race-specific effect in educational ttainment; hence, the negative coeffi- 
cient on MEXICAN in the wage equation is at least weakly indicative of 
discrimination. 
This is also strong evidence of discrimination against Other Latinos. 
There is a positive race-specific effect for this group in educational t- 
tainment, but the coefficient on OTHRLAT in the wage equation is insig- 
nificant. In the absence of discrimination, this coefficient would be posi- 
tive and significant. 
The insignificant coefficients on CUBAN and PRICAN are not consis- 
tent with either a strong or a weak indication of discrimination against 
these groups. On the other hand, the negative coefficients on BROWN 
and LATINO indicates the likely presence of wage discrimination against 
Latinos as a whole, especially non-white Latinos. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This article has examined the interrelationships among race, culture, 
skill, and the distribution of wages. I utilized a three-equation system to 
explore this process: skill is a multidimensional productive attribute mea- 
sured by years of education and work effort; educational ttainment is a 
function of class background and individual effort; and, individual wage 
rates are a function of skill and class background. By further assuming 
that effort is differentially distributed across individuals and social groups, 
I was able to estimate reduced form equations for educational nd earn- 
ings attainment, where both equations are functions of the class back- 
grounds and race of individuals. 
For the high school diploma or less, African Americans have utilized 
supra-normal effort to reduce the white-African American education gap. 
For the high school diploma or less, I cannot reject he null hypothesis of 
equal educational effort between whites and individuals of Cuban or 
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Puerto Rican origin or between whites and native-born Mexican Ameri- 
can and Other Latinos; and, there is a negative race-specific effect for 
immigrant men of Mexican origin and foreign-born Other Latinos. With 
respect to post-secondary education, I cannot conclusively reject he null 
hypothesis of equal intergroup educational effort between whites and 
African Americans, between whites and Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto 
Rican men, but there is a positive race-specific effect for Other Latinos. 
Also, for post-secondary education, there is moderate evidence of a posi- 
tive race-specific effect for African American men. 
The results also highlight he importance of race and national origin 
among Latinos. In particular, self-identified white Latinos tend to obtain 
higher amounts of education than brown Latinos and tend to have a 
positive earnings differential I do not present the results here, but I also 
found that the positive earnings differential for white Latinos remains 
statistically significant when years of education is included as a regres- 
sor; hence, self-identified white and brown Latinos may have differential 
returns to productive attributes. This is an area for further investigation. 
In the earnings process, African Americans are paid about 0.10 log 
points less than whites, so at least one-third of the gross African Ameri- 
can-white wage differential isunexplained. Given the positive race-specific 
effect for African Americans in the skill acquisition process, there is 
strong evidence that this unexplained ifferential is in fact pure wage 
discrimination. 
Similarly, there is strong evidence of discrimination against Other 
Latinos, who have an 8-17 percent greater probability of graduating 
from high school than otherwise identical white men and a 31-55 percent 
greater probability of obtaining post-secondary education (given that they 
have graduated from high school). Yet, the race-specific effect in the 
wage equation is negative and insignificant. With their greater effort in 
skill acquisition, the latter ace-specific effect in the wage equation should 
be clearly positive. 
The negative race-specific for Mexican Americans in both the educa- 
tional attainment and wage equation, when immigrants are included in 
the sample, makes it difficult to assert strong conclusions regarding the 
presence of discrimination. For native-born Mexican Americans there is 
no race-specific effect in educational ttainment; hence, the negative 
race-specific effect in the wage equation is at least weak confirmation of 
discrimination against native-born Mexican Americans. 
I found no race-specific effect for either Cuban or Puerto Rican men, 
in either the educational ttainment orwage equations. 
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For Latinos as a whole, especially self-identified brown Latinos, the 
results are mixed and it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. For brown 
Latinos, there is a negative race-specific n the wage equation and (more 
likely than not) a negative race-specific effect in the educational ttain- 
ment process. But, the very process of self-identifying asbrown may be a 
result of social and economic discrimination. For all Latinos, there is no 
negative race-specific effect in educational attainment among the 
native-born; indeed, this coefficient is positive but insignificant. How- 
ever, the coefficient for all Latinos in the native-born wage equation is 
negative and insignificant. When immigrants are included in the sample, 
there is a negative race-specific years of education effect and a negative 
race-specific wage effect for all Latinos. Clearly, considerably more re- 
search needs to be done on the interrelationships between citizenship 
status, racial identity, national origin, and the distribution of wages among 
Latinos. 
Collectively, the results of this article challenge the conventional wis- 
dom among economists that African American and Latino job skills are 
of a lower quality than white job skills. To the extent hat effort is an 
important element of worker skill our results uggest that neither African 
American nor Latino labor is of lower quality than white labor. The 
results regarding African American-white differences in educational t- 
tainment, i.e., African Americans are able to translate a given level of 
resources into higher levels of educational ttainment, reaffirm previous 
findings in the literature. The results on Latino--white ducational ttain- 
ment differences are novel Additionally, unlike previous research, this 
article connects racial differences in the skill acquisition process to the 
economics of discrimination. Thus, it brings together two pieces of the 
empirical literature that no one else has attempted to link. 
To reiterate, the major empirical issue in the economics of discrimina- 
tion is whether the race variable in the wage equation captures discrimi- 
nation against Latinos and African Americans or whether the mean indi- 
vidual from these social groups has lower amounts of unobserved pro- 
ductive attributes than the mean white. Rather than continuously repeat 
the cumbersome phrase "unobserved productive attributes," I have em- 
ployed the word "effort." This article finds that the data is not consistent 
with the assertation that unobserved labor quality or effort is lower among 
African Americans and Latinos; hence, the coefficient on race in the 
standard wage equation is best intepreted as a pure measure of discrimi- 
nation. Moreover, I have also pointed to several additional sources whose 
results are complementary to the work I present here. 
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Nevertheless, critics may take issue with the success of this article in 
linking educational effort to labor market effort as a strategy for inter- 
preting the race coefficient in the wage equation. For example, critics 
might well argue that employers' evaluations of effort in the labor mar- 
ket process are not conditioned on family background; hence, the conclu- 
sions of the article would be more palatable if there were some direct 
empirical links between educational effort and work effort. Such criti- 
cism is correct as far as it goes: it is always better to have more observ- 
able information. Given this, exactly how does one go about establishing 
direct empirical inks to unobserved attributes? If this data were avail- 
able, I would directly include the variables in the wage equation. How- 
ever, unless one believes that the distribution of unobserved labor quality 
is genetically determined, it is reasonable to use family background to 
control for at least some of an individual's unobserved characteristics, 
especially the extent of class privilege and degree of access to persons 
with decision-making authority and control over resources. Moreover, 
even if one were to accept hat employers do not condition on family 
background in assessing effort, some employers may very well condition 
on race in assessing effort (unobserved ability)--which, again, supports 
the main point of this article. 
A second line of criticism might suggest that the estimated model of 
educational ttainment has omitted variables. For example, holding fam- 
ily background constant, African Americans and Latinos may have pref- 
erential access to scholarships, loans, or other funds. Presumably, this 
line of criticism would suggest that if it is easier for African Americans 
or Latinos of a given social background to be admitted to a good college 
than an otherwise identical white, then the average African American 
may actually put forth less effort than the average white. Or, if African 
Americans and Latinos attend primary and secondary schools with less 
challenging promotional requirements than those attended by whites then 
the positive coefficient on race in the educational ttainment equation 
may simply reflect hese less challenging promotion policies rather than 
supra-normal effort. 
Again, this line of criticism is correct as far as it goes: a) interracial 
improvements in years of education does not necessarily imply any inter- 
racial gain in the quality of education; and b) if the average African 
American or Latino received systematic preferential treatment in college 
admissions at good colleges then there might be some effect on African 
American and Latino educational effort. Yet, this line of criticism would 
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be unnecessary speculation. As I have indicated in the introduction, from 
1865 to the present both African American and white years of education 
have been increasing but African American years of education increased 
faster. There was a substantial mount of racially preferential treatment 
in American society from at least 1877 to at least 1965, but none of this 
preferential treatment in the education process or the labor market was 
directed at either African Americans or Latinos. Hence, none of the 
interracial gains made prior to the mid-1960s could possibly be linked to 
systematic bias toward African Americans. And, Jaynes and Williams 
also establish that it is simply wrong to conclude that government policy 
alone is responsible for the substantial interracial educational improve- 
ment of African Americans during the post-1965 era. 
Also, even if one were to grant the assertion of preferential treatment 
for African Americans and Latinos (and opposed to all individuals from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds) atgood colleges, it does not 
immediately follow that this should reduce the average level of educa- 
tional effort of the members of either group. The results presented here 
show that the major impact of racial differences in effort occurs during 
the pre-college years. Hence, any alleged admissions policy of preferen- 
tial treatment at good colleges for Latinos and African Americans is of 
very little consequence since those policies clearly do not outweigh the 
other interracial differences in impediments to college attendance. 
Additionally, if the gains in years of education are due to African 
Americans and Latinos having to meet less rigid standards for promotion 
than whites, then critics of the results presented here must explain why 
standardized test scores of African Americans and Latinos relative to 
whites increased substantially from 1970 to about 1989. (See references 
in introduction.) 
A third line of criticism is that educational ttainment has been mod- 
eled in an ad hoc manner. Perhaps. Nevertheless, I have utilized a model 
that is quite common in the received literature. The specific model of 
educational chievement employed in this article was more or less identi- 
cal to the model found in the widely cited work of Haveman and Wolfe. 
(This article also utilizes the same dataset.) The citation by Haveman and 
Wolfe also contains references to other researchers who have employed 
the same model, both in sociology and in economics. In a commonly 
used equation with a common set of explanatory variables, it would be 
somewhat redundant to explain why each variable is included in the 
model. 
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I am certain that I have not exhausted the set of objections keptics 
may wish to raise regarding this article's tatistical results. After all, they 
dramatically challenge the conventional wisdom. In the large set of un- 
observed variables that may be omitted from educational ttainment and 
wage equations it is at least conceptually possible that African Ameri- 
cans may possess higher levels (or qualities) of some subset of those 
variables. Hence, single equation models of interracial wage differentials 
may actually underestimate he extent of discrimination. Given that 
supra-normal effort (higher levels of unobserved ability) is often an im- 
portant explanatory factor in the upward mobility of selected groups of 
whites, i.e., immigrants and Jews, it is somewhat surprising that a similar 
hypothesis has not been seriously investigated by economists with re- 
spect o African American education and earnings. 
This article remains agnostic on whether supra-normal effort is an 
imbedded ethno-cultural pattern or merely a response to social and eco- 
nomic discrimination. In any case, the African American-white racial 
gap in educational chievement (as measured by the National Assess- 
ment of Educational Progress) reversed its historic declining trend during 
the late 1980s. However, the preliminary findings of the 1994 NAEP 
suggests that the divergence may have come to a halt (Hauser, 1996:22). 
Additional research is needed to determine if these changes are the result 
of a cultural gap between today's youth and older generations, or, are the 
result of government policy ushered in during the early 1980s. 
NOTES 
1. See Mason (1995b) for a competitive theory of discrimination that does not 
rely on equal market treatment of economically identical workers. See Oaxaca (1994) 
for a review and further development of discrimination indexes. 
2. For this article, "whites" is shorthand for the more cumbersome phrase 
"Non-Hispanic white males." For the dataset, "Latino" is not inclusive of individuals 
of Spanish national origin. Where designated, "white Latinos" refers to Latinos who 
have self-identified aswhite, while "brown Latinos" refers to individuals who have 
self-identified asbrown, Chicano, Boricua, black, Moreno, or other Spanish descrip- 
tor when queried on their acial identification (as opposed to national origin). 
The U.S. census identifies Hispanics as individuals who may be either "black" or 
"white." Therefore, in the census, Hispanics are not a racial group. However, it 
becomes a bit cumbersome to continually refer to "racial/ethnic" differences among 
African Americans, whites, and Hispanics---especially when there are ethnic differ- 
ences within each of these groups. Thereby, we treat Hispanics as a racial group 
within this article and employ the term Latino in order to emphasize that distinction. 
3. Bernstein presents evidence that this may have come to a halt, or even re- 
versed, during the very late 1980s. 
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4. For example, it is still the case that African Americans are more likely to be in 
schools with larger average class sizes than whites and are more likely to be in larger 
classes within a particular school type (Boozer and Rouse, 1995). 
5. Equation (2) does not neglect he price and income variables central to the 
human capital analysis of the demand for education. As Freeman (1986a:369) sum- 
marizes, "There is a powerful positive relation between one's family background, 
measured by family income, occupation or education of parents, and schooling." 
6. Individuals from elite social class backgrounds are able to obtain higher earn- 
ings because they have greater access to persons embedded into positions of power 
and authority in the job market (Granovetter, 1988) and because their wealth pro- 
vides greater bargaining power in the labor market (Bowles and Gintis, 1990). 
7. Haveman and Wolfe (1994:143-187) also employ a simultaneous bivariate 
probit model of educational attainment and obtain results analogous to those re- 
ported in the text. For the technical details on estimating a bivariate probit model, 
see Greene (1993:660--663). 
8. Survey Research Center, "The 1990 Panel Study on Income Dynamics/Latino 
National Political Survey," Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, April, 1992. 
9. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth does contain information on school 
characteristics. However, both Maxwell (1995) and O'Neill (1990) found school 
characteristics to be statistically insignificant determinants of educational ttainment 
when class (socioeconomic background) is adequately controlled for in the regres- 
sion. 
10. Freeman (1986b) and Datcher-Loury and Loury (1986) provide interesting 
studies on the role of religion and labor market outcomes for young African Ameri- 
can males. These studies provide some limited affirmation of the notion that the 
process of attending church does produce values and behaviors that are conducive to 
increasing labor supply and increasing earnings. However, the current study mea- 
sures only religious affiliation--not worship attendance--and this study is not lim- 
ited to young males. Freeman makes the careful observation that, "it is the act of 
churchgoing, not religious attitudes that affects behavior" (p. 369). 
11. Among others, Rodgers, Spriggs, and Waaler (1997) provide data that the 
unadjusted istributions of highest grade completed by age and by race show that 
African American men obtain fewer years of education for any given grade level. 
12. See Borjas (1990) for an estimate of the quantitative importance of this 
problem. 
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